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Bubblewrap
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==========
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Many container runtime tools like `systemd-nspawn`, `docker`,
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etc. focus on providing infrastructure for system administrators and
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orchestration tools (e.g. Kubernetes) to run containers.
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These tools are not suitable to give to unprivileged users, because it
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is trivial to turn such access into to a fully privileged root shell
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on the host.
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User namespaces
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---------------
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There is an effort in the Linux kernel called
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[user namespaces](https://www.google.com/search?q=user+namespaces+site%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Flwn.net)
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which attempts to allow unprivileged users to use container features.
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While significant progress has been made, there are
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[still concerns](https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/) about it, and
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it is not available to unprivileged users in several production distributions
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such as CentOS/Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, Debian Jessie, etc.
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See for example
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[CVE-2016-3135](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3135)
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which is a local root vulnerability introduced by userns.
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[This March 2016 post](https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/9/555) has some
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more discussion.
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Bubblewrap could be viewed as setuid implementation of a *subset* of
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user namespaces. Emphasis on subset - specifically relevant to the
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above CVE, bubblewrap does not allow control over iptables.
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The original bubblewrap code existed before user namespaces - it inherits code from
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[xdg-app helper](https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xdg-app/xdg-app/tree/common/xdg-app-helper.c)
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which in turn distantly derives from
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[linux-user-chroot](https://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot).
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Security
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--------
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The maintainers of this tool believe that it does not, even when used
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in combination with typical software installed on that distribution,
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allow privilege escalation. It may increase the ability of a logged
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in user to perform denial of service attacks, however.
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In particular, bubblewrap uses `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` to turn off
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setuid binaries, which is the [traditional way](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chroot#Limitations) to get out of things
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like chroots.
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Users
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-----
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This program can be shared by all container tools which perform
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non-root operation, such as:
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- [xdg-app](https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xdg-app/xdg-app)
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- [rpm-ostree unprivileged](https://github.com/projectatomic/rpm-ostree/pull/209)
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We would also like to see this be available in Kubernetes/OpenShift
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clusters. Having the ability for unprivileged users to use container
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features would make it significantly easier to do interactive
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debugging scenarios and the like.
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Usage
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-----
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bubblewrap works by creating a new, completely empty, mount
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namespace where the root is on a tmpfs that is invisible from the
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host, and will be automatically cleaned up when the last process
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exists. You can then use commandline options to construct the root
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filesystem and process environment and command to run in the
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namespace.
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A simple example is
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```
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bwrap --ro-bind / / bash
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```
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This will create a read-only bind mount of the host root at the
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sandbox root, and then start a bash.
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Another simple example would be a read-write chroot operation:
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```
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bwrap --bind /some/chroot/dir / bash
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```
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A more complex example is to run a with a custom (readonly) /usr,
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but your own (tmpfs) data, running in a PID and network namespace:
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```
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bwrap --ro-bind /usr /usr \
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--tmpfs /tmp \
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--proc /proc \
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--dev /dev \
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--ro-bind /etc/resolv.conf /etc/resolv.conf \
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--symlink usr/lib /lib \
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--symlink usr/lib64 /lib64 \
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--symlink usr/bin /bin \
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--symlink usr/sbin /sbin \
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--chdir / \
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--unshare-pid \
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--unshare-net \
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--dir /run/user/$(id -u) \
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--setenv XDG_RUNTIME_DIR "/run/user/`id -u`" \
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/bin/sh
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```
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Sandboxing
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----------
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The goal of bubblewrap is to run an application in a sandbox, where it
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has restricted access to parts of the operating system or user data
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such as the home directory.
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bubblewrap always creates a new mount namespace, and the user can specify
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exactly what parts of the filesystem should be visible in the sandbox.
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Any such directories you specify mounted `nodev` by default, and can be made readonly.
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Additionally you can use these kernel features:
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User namespaces ([CLONE_NEWUSER](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): This hides all but the current uid and gid from the
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sandbox. You can also change what the value of uid/gid should be in the sandbox.
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IPC namespaces ([CLONE_NEWIPC](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will get its own copy of all the
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different forms of IPCs, like SysV shared memory and semaphores.
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PID namespaces ([CLONE_NEWPID](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will not see any processes outside the sandbox. Additionally, bubblewrap will run a trivial pid1 inside your container to handle the requirements of reaping children in the sandbox. .This avoids what is known now as the [Docker pid 1 problem](https://blog.phusion.nl/2015/01/20/docker-and-the-pid-1-zombie-reaping-problem/).
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Network namespaces ([CLONE_NEWNET](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will not see the network. Instead it will have its own network namespace with only a loopback device.
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UTS namespace ([CLONE_NEWUTS](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will have its own hostname.
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Seccomp filters: You can pass in seccomp filters that limit which syscalls can be done in the sandbox. For more information, see [Seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp).
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Related project comparison: Firejail
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------------------------------------
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[Firejail](https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/tree/master/src/firejail) is
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similar to xdg-app before bubblewrap was split out in that it combines
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a setuid tool with a lot of desktop-specific sandboxing features. For
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example, Firejail knows about Pulseaudio, whereas bubblewrap does not.
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The bubblewrap authors believe it's much easier to audit a small
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setuid program, and keep features such as Pulseaudio filtering as an
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unprivileged process, as now occurs in xdg-app.
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Also, @cgwalters thinks trying to
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[whitelist file paths](https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/blob/37a5a3545ef6d8d03dad8bbd888f53e13274c9e5/src/firejail/fs_whitelist.c#L176)
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is a bad idea given the myriad ways users have to manipulate paths,
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and the myriad ways in which system administrators may configure a
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system. The bubblewrap approach is to only retain a few specific
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Linux capabilities such as `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, but to always access the
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filesystem as the invoking uid. This entirely closes
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[TOCTOCU attacks](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html) and
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such.
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Related project comparison: Sandstorm.io
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----------------------------------------
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[Sandstorm.io](https://sandstorm.io/) also has a setuid helper
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process. @cgwalters believes their setuid code is fairly good, but it
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could still make sense to unify on bubblewrap as a setuid core. That
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hasn't been ruled out, but neither is it being actively pursued today.
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Related project comparison: runc/binctr
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----------------------------------------
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[runc](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc) is similar to
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[systemd nspawn](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-nspawn.html)
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in that it is tooling intended to be invoked by root. There is an
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effort to have runc optionally use
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[user namespaces](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/38),
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but no plans for any setuid support.
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The bubblewrap authors believe that runc and systemd-nspawn are not
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designed to be made setuid and are distant from supporting such a
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mode.
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[binctr](https://github.com/jfrazelle/binctr) is just a wrapper for
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runc, so inherits all of its design tradeoffs.
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Whats with the name ?!
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----------------------
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The name bubblewrap was chosen to convey that this
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tool runs as the parent of the application (so wraps it in some sense) and creates
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a protective layer (the sandbox) around it.
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(Bubblewrap cat by [dancing_stupidity](https://www.flickr.com/photos/27549668@N03/))
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