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No commits in common. "c162c4bdde8912cac2db1e873f368221736ad116" and "cd04d34b2373a3c139e36d18e12f345d85010c3f" have entirely different histories.

14 changed files with 56 additions and 776 deletions

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@ -85,29 +85,6 @@ services:
networks:
- kaboot-network
kaboot-sandbox:
build:
context: ./server/sandbox
dockerfile: Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
read_only: true
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
cap_drop:
- ALL
environment:
MAX_CONCURRENT: "2"
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=200M,mode=1777
deploy:
replicas: ${SANDBOX_REPLICAS:-4}
resources:
limits:
cpus: '1'
memory: 512M
networks:
- kaboot-network
kaboot-backend:
build:
context: ./server
@ -128,14 +105,10 @@ services:
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET: ${STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET:-}
STRIPE_PRICE_ID_MONTHLY: ${STRIPE_PRICE_ID_MONTHLY:-}
STRIPE_PRICE_ID_YEARLY: ${STRIPE_PRICE_ID_YEARLY:-}
SANDBOX_URL: http://kaboot-sandbox:3002
USE_SANDBOX: "true"
volumes:
- kaboot-data:/data
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=100M
depends_on:
- kaboot-sandbox
networks:
- kaboot-network

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@ -97,33 +97,6 @@ services:
networks:
- kaboot-network
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# KABOOT - Document Conversion Sandbox (isolated LibreOffice)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
kaboot-sandbox:
build:
context: ./server/sandbox
dockerfile: Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
read_only: true
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
cap_drop:
- ALL
environment:
MAX_CONCURRENT: "2"
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=200M,mode=1777
deploy:
replicas: ${SANDBOX_REPLICAS:-2}
resources:
limits:
cpus: '1'
memory: 512M
networks:
- kaboot-network
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# KABOOT - Application Backend
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@ -145,8 +118,6 @@ services:
CORS_ORIGIN: http://localhost:${KABOOT_FRONTEND_PORT:-5173},http://${KABOOT_HOST:-localhost}:${KABOOT_FRONTEND_PORT:-5173}
LOG_REQUESTS: ${LOG_REQUESTS:-true}
GEMINI_API_KEY: ${GEMINI_API_KEY:-}
SANDBOX_URL: http://kaboot-sandbox:3002
USE_SANDBOX: "true"
volumes:
- ./data:/data
tmpfs:
@ -155,7 +126,6 @@ services:
- "${KABOOT_BACKEND_PORT:-3001}:3001"
depends_on:
- authentik-server
- kaboot-sandbox
networks:
- kaboot-network

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@ -408,68 +408,6 @@ Then run the dev server with `npm run dev -- --host` to bind to all interfaces.
- Verify `OIDC_ISSUER` and `OIDC_JWKS_URI` are correct
- The backend must be able to reach Authentik at `http://authentik-server:9000` (Docker network)
## Required OIDC Claims
The Kaboot backend validates the following JWT claims:
| Claim | Required | Description |
|-------|----------|-------------|
| `sub` | Yes | User identifier (subject) |
| `iss` | Yes | Must match `OIDC_ISSUER` env var |
| `aud` | Recommended | Must match `OIDC_AUDIENCE` env var if set |
| `preferred_username` | No | Display name, falls back to `sub` |
| `email` | No | User's email address |
| `groups` | No | Array of group names for access control |
### Audience Claim Configuration
The `aud` (audience) claim prevents tokens issued for other applications from being accepted. The blueprint configures this automatically via the `kaboot` scope.
**Backend Configuration:**
```bash
# Set to your OIDC client ID
OIDC_AUDIENCE=kaboot-spa
```
**Frontend Configuration:**
The frontend must request the `kaboot` scope to include the audience claim:
```typescript
// src/config/oidc.ts
scope: 'openid profile email offline_access groups kaboot'
```
**Manual Authentik Setup (if not using blueprints):**
1. Go to **Customisation** > **Property Mappings**
2. Click **Create** > **Scope Mapping**
3. Configure:
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Name | `Kaboot Audience Scope` |
| Scope name | `kaboot` |
| Expression | `return {"aud": "kaboot-spa"}` |
4. Go to **Applications** > **Providers** > **Kaboot OAuth2**
5. Edit and add the new scope mapping to **Scopes**
### Groups Claim for Access Control
The `groups` claim controls access to premium features:
| Group | Access Level |
|-------|--------------|
| `kaboot-users` | Basic access (required to use app) |
| `kaboot-ai-access` | Unlimited AI generations, OCR access |
| `kaboot-admin` | Admin features |
The groups scope mapping is configured in the blueprint. For manual setup:
1. Create a scope mapping with expression:
```python
return {"groups": [group.name for group in request.user.ak_groups.all()]}
```
2. Add it to the provider's scopes
## Production Notes
For production deployment, see [PRODUCTION.md](./PRODUCTION.md) for full instructions.

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@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
# AUDIT
High / Critical Findings
- Client-exposed Gemini system key risk. vite.config.ts injects process.env.GEMINI_API_KEY into the frontend bundle and services/geminiService.ts falls back to process.env.API_KEY; if a server/system key is set, it becomes visible to all clients and bypasses backend access controls. Recommend removing env injection for secrets and using only POST /api/generate for system AI. Evidence: vite.config.ts, services/geminiService.ts:6-12.
- Untrusted document parsing runs native tooling. server/src/services/documentParser.ts uses LibreOffice + multiple parsers on attacker-supplied files; even without command injection, crafted docs are a common RCE vector. Treat as high risk unless sandboxed. Recommend running conversions in a container/worker with seccomp/AppArmor, low privileges, CPU/memory limits, and timeouts. Evidence: server/src/services/documentParser.ts:223-226.
- Memory-heavy file uploads without per-endpoint rate limits. multer.memoryStorage() accepts up to 50MB and parsing happens synchronously; repeated requests can exhaust RAM/CPU. Recommend per-route rate limits + streaming to disk or queueing with concurrency caps. Evidence: server/src/routes/upload.ts:11-18.
Medium Findings
- JWT audience not validated. requireAuth verifies issuer/alg but not aud. A token minted for another client with the same issuer could be accepted. Recommend adding audience validation (client_id) and optionally azp. Evidence: server/src/middleware/auth.ts:58-64.
- Tokens and API keys stored in localStorage. OIDC user store and API keys are persisted client-side, which is vulnerable to XSS. Mitigation: prefer in-memory storage or httpOnly cookies; avoid persisting API keys. Evidence: src/config/oidc.ts:17, hooks/useUserPreferences.ts:17-48, hooks/useGame.ts:62-74.
- Public game lookup is enumerable if PINs are short. GET /api/games/:pin is unauthenticated (rate-limited) and returns game metadata. If PIN length is small, enumeration is plausible. Consider longer pins, additional throttling, or auth for non-host data. Evidence: server/src/routes/games.ts:85-107.
Low Findings / Hardening
- Auth error details echoed to client. requireAuth returns details: err.message which can leak verifier details. Recommend generic responses and server-only logs. Evidence: server/src/middleware/auth.ts:66-69.
- Logging includes share tokens and pins. When LOG_REQUESTS=true, paths like /api/shared/:token are logged. Consider redacting or omitting sensitive paths. Evidence: server/src/index.ts:52-58, server/src/routes/shared.ts.
- CORS uses credentials: true with configurable origin. If cookies are ever used in future, misconfiguration could enable CSRF. Recommend disabling credentials unless needed, and enforce HTTPS origins in prod. Evidence: server/src/index.ts:42-46.
Positive Controls Observed
- Parametrized SQL across routes (no obvious SQLi). server/src/routes/*.ts.
- JWT verification uses RS256 and JWKS with caching. server/src/middleware/auth.ts.
- Stripe webhook signature verification present. server/src/routes/payments.ts:337.
- Helmet with CSP enabled on backend responses. server/src/index.ts:17-28.
- No dangerouslySetInnerHTML found in frontend.
Key Recommendation Order
1. Remove client-side exposure of GEMINI_API_KEY and force system AI through backend. (vite.config.ts, services/geminiService.ts)
2. Sandbox document parsing / LibreOffice conversions. (server/src/services/documentParser.ts)
3. Add audience validation for JWTs. (server/src/middleware/auth.ts)
4. Add upload-specific throttling and reduce memory pressure. (server/src/routes/upload.ts)
5. Reduce client-side secret persistence (move to in-memory / httpOnly). (src/config/oidc.ts, hooks/useUserPreferences.ts)
# Security Plan (Kaboot)
This plan turns the audit findings into a tracked, testable remediation roadmap.
## Goals
- [x] Eliminate client-side exposure of system AI secrets and enforce server-side access control only.
- [x] Reduce risk of RCE/DoS in document parsing and uploads. *(sandboxing, rate limits, circuit breaker all done)*
- [ ] Harden token validation and client storage practices. *(JWT aud validation done; client storage pending)*
- [ ] Improve auditability, logging hygiene, and safe rollout.
## Scope
- [ ] Backend entrypoints and middleware: `server/src/index.ts`, `server/src/routes/*.ts`, `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`.
- [ ] Document processing: `server/src/services/documentParser.ts`, `server/src/routes/upload.ts`.
- [ ] Frontend auth/storage and AI clients: `src/config/oidc.ts`, `hooks/useUserPreferences.ts`, `hooks/useAuthenticatedFetch.ts`, `services/geminiService.ts`.
- [ ] Build/config surfaces: `vite.config.ts`, `.env.example`, `docker-compose*.yml`, `docs/*`.
## Assumptions
- [ ] Backend is the only trusted system for system AI generation.
- [ ] Auth provider is Authentik with OIDC JWTs.
- [ ] Uploads may be attacker-controlled and should be treated as hostile.
## Phase 0 - Baseline and Inventory
- [ ] Inventory all secrets and confirm none are present in repo or frontend bundles.
- [ ] Verify current auth boundary: which routes require `requireAuth` vs public.
- [ ] Record current rate limits and error handling for uploads, generation, games, and shared endpoints.
- [ ] Add a basic secret scan in CI (gitleaks/trufflehog) and document false-positive exclusions.
## Phase 1 - Critical Remediations
### 1) Remove Client Exposure of System AI Key
- [x] Remove `process.env.GEMINI_API_KEY` exposure from `vite.config.ts`.
- [x] Remove `process.env.API_KEY` fallback in `services/geminiService.ts`.
- [x] Ensure all system AI usage flows through `POST /api/generate` only.
- [ ] Validate that built frontend bundles do not contain Gemini keys.
### 2) Sandbox Document Processing
- [x] Move LibreOffice conversion to a sandboxed worker/container (no network, low privileges).
- [x] Enforce per-job CPU/memory limits and execution timeouts.
- [x] Store temp files in a private directory (0700) and clean up consistently.
- [x] Add a circuit breaker for repeated failures or timeouts.
### 3) Upload Abuse Protection
- [x] Add route-specific rate limiting for `POST /api/upload`.
- [x] Cap concurrent uploads per user and per IP.
- [ ] Consider streaming to disk or queueing (avoid large in-memory buffers when possible).
### 4) JWT Audience Validation
- [x] Validate `aud` (and `azp` if present) in `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`.
- [x] Document required OIDC claims in `docs/AUTHENTIK_SETUP.md`.
## Phase 2 - Hardening
### 1) Games Endpoint Risk Reduction
- [x] Increase PIN entropy or move to a join token.
- [ ] Require host proof (secret or auth) for state mutation endpoints.
- [ ] Add per-endpoint throttling for public lookups.
### 2) Logging and Error Hygiene
- [ ] Redact sensitive paths/tokens in request logs (`server/src/index.ts`).
- [x] Return generic auth errors to clients; keep details server-only (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`).
### 3) CORS and CSRF Posture
- [ ] Review use of `credentials: true` and disable if not required.
- [ ] Enforce HTTPS origins in production configs.
### 4) Privacy and Disclosure
- [ ] Add a user-facing notice that documents may be sent to external AI providers.
- [ ] Document data handling and retention for uploads and AI generation.
## Phase 3 - Verification
- [ ] Add tests for JWT `aud` mismatches and invalid tokens.
- [ ] Add upload tests for size limits, malformed files, and parser errors.
- [ ] Add regression tests for shared and game endpoints (rate limiting and access).
- [ ] Run dependency vulnerability checks in CI (`npm audit` or Snyk).
- [ ] Verify no secrets appear in logs or built assets.
## Phase 4 - Rollout
- [ ] Deploy to staging and validate auth, upload, generation, and payments end-to-end.
- [ ] Rotate exposed keys after client bundle no longer includes secrets.
- [ ] Use feature flags for upload pipeline changes.
- [ ] Monitor latency, 429s, error rates, and upload failures for 48h post-deploy.
## Deliverables
- [ ] Code changes with references and rationale per file.
- [ ] Updated docs for system AI, uploads, and privacy.
- [ ] Test report and monitoring checklist.
- [ ] Post-remediation security summary with residual risks.

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@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ FROM node:22-alpine
WORKDIR /app
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++ curl
# Build dependencies + LibreOffice for legacy Office format conversion
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++ libreoffice curl
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm install

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@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
FROM node:22-alpine
RUN apk add --no-cache libreoffice curl \
&& addgroup -g 1000 sandbox \
&& adduser -u 1000 -G sandbox -s /bin/sh -D sandbox \
&& mkdir -p /app /tmp/convert \
&& chown -R sandbox:sandbox /app /tmp/convert
WORKDIR /app
COPY --chown=sandbox:sandbox package.json ./
RUN npm install --omit=dev
COPY --chown=sandbox:sandbox convert.js ./
USER sandbox
EXPOSE 3002
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD curl -f http://localhost:3002/health || exit 1
CMD ["node", "convert.js"]

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@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
import { createServer } from 'http';
import { exec } from 'child_process';
import { writeFile, readFile, unlink, mkdir, readdir } from 'fs/promises';
import { existsSync } from 'fs';
import { join } from 'path';
import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3002;
const TEMP_DIR = '/tmp/convert';
const TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;
const MAX_FILE_SIZE = 50 * 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_CONCURRENT = parseInt(process.env.MAX_CONCURRENT || '3', 10);
const EXTENSION_TO_OUTPUT = {
'.ppt': 'pptx',
'.doc': 'docx',
'.xls': 'xlsx',
};
let activeJobs = 0;
let queuedJobs = 0;
async function cleanup(dir) {
if (!existsSync(dir)) return;
try {
for (const file of await readdir(dir)) {
await unlink(join(dir, file)).catch(() => {});
}
await unlink(dir).catch(() => {});
} catch {}
}
function runLibreOffice(inputPath, outputDir, outputExt) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
reject(new Error('timeout'));
}, TIMEOUT_MS);
exec(
`libreoffice --headless --convert-to ${outputExt} --outdir "${outputDir}" "${inputPath}"`,
{ maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024 },
(error) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
if (error) reject(error);
else resolve();
}
);
});
}
async function processConversion(buffer, ext) {
const jobId = randomUUID();
const jobDir = join(TEMP_DIR, jobId);
const inputPath = join(jobDir, `input${ext}`);
const outputExt = EXTENSION_TO_OUTPUT[ext];
const outputPath = join(jobDir, `input.${outputExt}`);
try {
await mkdir(jobDir, { mode: 0o700 });
await writeFile(inputPath, buffer, { mode: 0o600 });
await runLibreOffice(inputPath, jobDir, outputExt);
if (!existsSync(outputPath)) {
throw new Error('no_output');
}
return await readFile(outputPath);
} finally {
await cleanup(jobDir);
}
}
async function handleConvert(req, res) {
if (activeJobs >= MAX_CONCURRENT) {
queuedJobs++;
if (queuedJobs > MAX_CONCURRENT * 2) {
queuedJobs--;
res.writeHead(503, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Server busy, try again later' }));
return;
}
await new Promise((resolve) => {
const check = setInterval(() => {
if (activeJobs < MAX_CONCURRENT) {
clearInterval(check);
queuedJobs--;
resolve();
}
}, 100);
});
}
activeJobs++;
const chunks = [];
let size = 0;
req.on('data', (chunk) => {
size += chunk.length;
if (size <= MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
chunks.push(chunk);
}
});
req.on('end', async () => {
if (size > MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
activeJobs--;
res.writeHead(413, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'File too large' }));
return;
}
const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`);
const ext = url.searchParams.get('ext');
if (!ext || !EXTENSION_TO_OUTPUT[ext]) {
activeJobs--;
res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Invalid or missing extension parameter' }));
return;
}
try {
const converted = await processConversion(Buffer.concat(chunks), ext);
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream',
'Content-Length': converted.length,
});
res.end(converted);
} catch (err) {
const message = err.message === 'timeout'
? 'Conversion timed out'
: err.message === 'no_output'
? 'Conversion produced no output'
: 'Conversion failed';
res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: message }));
} finally {
activeJobs--;
}
});
}
const server = createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.method === 'GET' && req.url === '/health') {
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', active: activeJobs, queued: queuedJobs }));
return;
}
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.url?.startsWith('/convert')) {
handleConvert(req, res);
return;
}
res.writeHead(404, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Not found' }));
});
if (!existsSync(TEMP_DIR)) {
await mkdir(TEMP_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
}
server.listen(PORT, '0.0.0.0', () => {
console.log(`Sandbox running on port ${PORT} (max ${MAX_CONCURRENT} concurrent)`);
});

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@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "kaboot-sandbox",
"version": "1.0.0",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"start": "node convert.js"
}
}

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@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ const runMigrations = () => {
pin TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
host_peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
host_secret TEXT NOT NULL,
host_user_id TEXT,
quiz_data TEXT NOT NULL,
game_config TEXT NOT NULL,
game_state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'LOBBY',
@ -186,12 +185,6 @@ const runMigrations = () => {
console.log("Migration: Added first_correct_player_id to game_sessions");
}
const hasHostUserId = sessionTableInfo.some(col => col.name === "host_user_id");
if (!hasHostUserId) {
db.exec("ALTER TABLE game_sessions ADD COLUMN host_user_id TEXT");
console.log("Migration: Added host_user_id to game_sessions");
}
const hasColorScheme = userTableInfo2.some(col => col.name === "color_scheme");
if (!hasColorScheme) {
db.exec("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN color_scheme TEXT DEFAULT 'blue'");

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@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS game_sessions (
pin TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
host_peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
host_secret TEXT NOT NULL,
host_user_id TEXT,
quiz_data TEXT NOT NULL,
game_config TEXT NOT NULL,
game_state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'LOBBY',

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@ -42,53 +42,6 @@ export interface AuthenticatedRequest extends Request {
user?: AuthenticatedUser;
}
export function optionalAuth(
req: AuthenticatedRequest,
res: Response,
next: NextFunction
): void {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
next();
return;
}
const token = authHeader.slice(7);
const verifyOptions: jwt.VerifyOptions = {
issuer: OIDC_ISSUER,
algorithms: ['RS256'],
};
if (OIDC_AUDIENCE) {
verifyOptions.audience = OIDC_AUDIENCE;
}
jwt.verify(
token,
getSigningKey,
verifyOptions,
(err, decoded) => {
if (err) {
console.error('Optional auth - token verification failed:', err.message);
next();
return;
}
const payload = decoded as jwt.JwtPayload;
req.user = {
sub: payload.sub!,
preferred_username: payload.preferred_username || payload.sub!,
email: payload.email,
name: payload.name,
groups: payload.groups || [],
};
next();
}
);
}
export function requireAuth(
req: AuthenticatedRequest,
res: Response,

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@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { Router, Request, Response } from 'express';
import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
import { db } from '../db/connection.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'crypto';
import { optionalAuth, AuthenticatedRequest } from '../middleware/auth.js';
const router = Router();
@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ interface GameSession {
pin: string;
host_peer_id: string;
host_secret: string;
host_user_id: string | null;
quiz_data: string;
game_config: string;
game_state: string;
@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ const cleanupExpiredSessions = () => {
setInterval(cleanupExpiredSessions, 60 * 1000);
router.post('/', gameCreationLimiter, optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response) => {
router.post('/', gameCreationLimiter, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
try {
const { pin, hostPeerId, quiz, gameConfig } = req.body;
@ -67,12 +65,11 @@ router.post('/', gameCreationLimiter, optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest,
}
const hostSecret = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
const hostUserId = req.user?.sub || null;
db.prepare(`
INSERT INTO game_sessions (pin, host_peer_id, host_secret, host_user_id, quiz_data, game_config, game_state, players_data)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'LOBBY', '[]')
`).run(pin, hostPeerId, hostSecret, hostUserId, JSON.stringify(quiz), JSON.stringify(gameConfig));
INSERT INTO game_sessions (pin, host_peer_id, host_secret, quiz_data, game_config, game_state, players_data)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'LOBBY', '[]')
`).run(pin, hostPeerId, hostSecret, JSON.stringify(quiz), JSON.stringify(gameConfig));
res.status(201).json({ success: true, hostSecret });
} catch (err: any) {
@ -114,29 +111,20 @@ router.get('/:pin', gameLookupLimiter, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
}
});
router.get('/:pin/host', optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response) => {
router.get('/:pin/host', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
try {
const { pin } = req.params;
const hostSecret = req.headers['x-host-secret'] as string;
const hostUserId = req.user?.sub;
if (!hostSecret && !hostUserId) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Host authentication required (X-Host-Secret header or Authorization token)' });
if (!hostSecret) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Host secret required' });
return;
}
const session = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ?').get(pin) as GameSession | undefined;
const session = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ? AND host_secret = ?').get(pin, hostSecret) as GameSession | undefined;
if (!session) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found' });
return;
}
const isValidSecret = hostSecret && session.host_secret === hostSecret;
const isValidUser = hostUserId && session.host_user_id === hostUserId;
if (!isValidSecret && !isValidUser) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found or invalid credentials' });
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found or invalid secret' });
return;
}
@ -156,30 +144,21 @@ router.get('/:pin/host', optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response
}
});
router.patch('/:pin', optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response) => {
router.patch('/:pin', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
try {
const { pin } = req.params;
const hostSecret = req.headers['x-host-secret'] as string;
const hostUserId = req.user?.sub;
const { hostPeerId, gameState, currentQuestionIndex, players, firstCorrectPlayerId } = req.body;
if (!hostSecret && !hostUserId) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Host authentication required (X-Host-Secret header or Authorization token)' });
if (!hostSecret) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Host secret required' });
return;
}
const session = db.prepare('SELECT pin, host_secret, host_user_id FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ?').get(pin) as GameSession | undefined;
const session = db.prepare('SELECT pin FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ? AND host_secret = ?').get(pin, hostSecret);
if (!session) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found' });
return;
}
const isValidSecret = hostSecret && session.host_secret === hostSecret;
const isValidUser = hostUserId && session.host_user_id === hostUserId;
if (!isValidSecret && !isValidUser) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found or invalid credentials' });
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found or invalid secret' });
return;
}
@ -213,12 +192,12 @@ router.patch('/:pin', optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response) =
}
updates.push('updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP');
values.push(pin);
values.push(pin, hostSecret);
db.prepare(`
UPDATE game_sessions
SET ${updates.join(', ')}
WHERE pin = ?
WHERE pin = ? AND host_secret = ?
`).run(...values);
res.json({ success: true });
@ -228,34 +207,23 @@ router.patch('/:pin', optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response) =
}
});
router.delete('/:pin', optionalAuth, (req: AuthenticatedRequest, res: Response) => {
router.delete('/:pin', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
try {
const { pin } = req.params;
const hostSecret = req.headers['x-host-secret'] as string;
const hostUserId = req.user?.sub;
if (!hostSecret && !hostUserId) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Host authentication required (X-Host-Secret header or Authorization token)' });
if (!hostSecret) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Host secret required' });
return;
}
const session = db.prepare('SELECT pin, host_secret, host_user_id FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ?').get(pin) as GameSession | undefined;
const result = db.prepare('DELETE FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ? AND host_secret = ?').run(pin, hostSecret);
if (!session) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found' });
if (result.changes === 0) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found or invalid secret' });
return;
}
const isValidSecret = hostSecret && session.host_secret === hostSecret;
const isValidUser = hostUserId && session.host_user_id === hostUserId;
if (!isValidSecret && !isValidUser) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Game not found or invalid credentials' });
return;
}
db.prepare('DELETE FROM game_sessions WHERE pin = ?').run(pin);
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
console.error('Error deleting game session:', err);

View file

@ -8,42 +8,6 @@ import { join } from 'path';
import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
const PROCESSING_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;
const SANDBOX_URL = process.env.SANDBOX_URL || 'http://localhost:3002';
const USE_SANDBOX = process.env.USE_SANDBOX !== 'false';
const CIRCUIT_BREAKER_THRESHOLD = 5;
const CIRCUIT_BREAKER_RESET_MS = 60000;
class CircuitBreaker {
private failures = 0;
private lastFailure = 0;
private open = false;
recordSuccess(): void {
this.failures = 0;
this.open = false;
}
recordFailure(): void {
this.failures++;
this.lastFailure = Date.now();
if (this.failures >= CIRCUIT_BREAKER_THRESHOLD) {
this.open = true;
}
}
isOpen(): boolean {
if (!this.open) return false;
if (Date.now() - this.lastFailure > CIRCUIT_BREAKER_RESET_MS) {
this.open = false;
this.failures = 0;
return false;
}
return true;
}
}
const sandboxCircuit = new CircuitBreaker();
export const GEMINI_NATIVE_TYPES = [
'application/pdf',
@ -237,51 +201,14 @@ function extractWithSheetJS(buffer: Buffer): string {
return textParts.join('\n\n');
}
// Map legacy extensions to their modern equivalents for LibreOffice conversion
const LEGACY_TO_MODERN: Record<string, string> = {
'.ppt': 'pptx',
'.doc': 'docx',
'.xls': 'xlsx',
};
async function convertViaSandbox(buffer: Buffer, extension: string): Promise<Buffer> {
if (sandboxCircuit.isOpen()) {
throw new Error('CIRCUIT_OPEN');
}
const controller = new AbortController();
const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), PROCESSING_TIMEOUT_MS);
try {
const response = await fetch(`${SANDBOX_URL}/convert?ext=${extension}`, {
method: 'POST',
body: buffer,
signal: controller.signal,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream' },
});
if (!response.ok) {
const error = await response.json().catch(() => ({ error: 'Conversion failed' }));
sandboxCircuit.recordFailure();
throw new Error(error.error || 'Document conversion failed');
}
sandboxCircuit.recordSuccess();
return Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'AbortError') {
sandboxCircuit.recordFailure();
throw new Error('Document conversion timed out. Try a smaller file.');
}
if (err instanceof Error && err.message !== 'CIRCUIT_OPEN') {
sandboxCircuit.recordFailure();
}
throw err;
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
async function convertLocally(buffer: Buffer, extension: string): Promise<Buffer> {
async function extractWithLibreOffice(buffer: Buffer, extension: string, useOcr: boolean = false): Promise<string> {
const tempId = randomUUID();
const privateTempDir = join(tmpdir(), `kaboot-${tempId}`);
const inputPath = join(privateTempDir, `input${extension}`);
@ -298,63 +225,47 @@ async function convertLocally(buffer: Buffer, extension: string): Promise<Buffer
mkdirSync(privateTempDir, { mode: 0o700 });
writeFileSync(inputPath, buffer, { mode: 0o600 });
execSync(
`libreoffice --headless --convert-to ${modernExt} --outdir "${privateTempDir}" "${inputPath}"`,
{ timeout: PROCESSING_TIMEOUT_MS, stdio: 'pipe', maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }
);
try {
execSync(
`libreoffice --headless --convert-to ${modernExt} --outdir "${privateTempDir}" "${inputPath}"`,
{ timeout: PROCESSING_TIMEOUT_MS, stdio: 'pipe', maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }
);
} catch (execError) {
const error = execError as Error & { code?: string; killed?: boolean };
if (error.killed) {
throw new Error('Document conversion timed out. Try a smaller file.');
}
if (error.code === 'ENOENT' || error.message?.includes('not found')) {
throw new Error(
`Legacy ${extension} files require LibreOffice for text extraction. ` +
`Please convert to .${modernExt} format or ensure LibreOffice is installed.`
);
}
throw new Error('Document conversion failed. The file may be corrupted.');
}
if (!existsSync(outputPath)) {
throw new Error('Document conversion produced no output.');
}
return readFileSync(outputPath);
} catch (execError) {
const error = execError as Error & { code?: string; killed?: boolean };
if (error.killed) {
throw new Error('Document conversion timed out. Try a smaller file.');
const convertedBuffer = readFileSync(outputPath);
const config = useOcr ? { extractAttachments: true, ocr: true, ocrLanguage: 'eng' } : {};
const ast = await officeParser.parseOffice(convertedBuffer, config);
let text = ast.toText();
if (useOcr && ast.attachments) {
for (const attachment of ast.attachments) {
if (attachment.ocrText) {
text += '\n' + attachment.ocrText;
}
}
}
if (error.code === 'ENOENT' || error.message?.includes('not found')) {
throw new Error(
`Legacy ${extension} files require LibreOffice for text extraction. ` +
`Please convert to .${LEGACY_TO_MODERN[extension]} format or ensure LibreOffice is installed.`
);
}
throw new Error('Document conversion failed. The file may be corrupted.');
return text;
} finally {
cleanup();
}
}
async function extractWithLibreOffice(buffer: Buffer, extension: string, useOcr: boolean = false): Promise<string> {
let convertedBuffer: Buffer;
if (USE_SANDBOX) {
try {
convertedBuffer = await convertViaSandbox(buffer, extension);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof Error && err.message === 'CIRCUIT_OPEN') {
throw new Error('Document conversion service temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a minute.');
}
throw err;
}
} else {
convertedBuffer = await convertLocally(buffer, extension);
}
const config = useOcr ? { extractAttachments: true, ocr: true, ocrLanguage: 'eng' } : {};
const ast = await officeParser.parseOffice(convertedBuffer, config);
let text = ast.toText();
if (useOcr && ast.attachments) {
for (const attachment of ast.attachments) {
if (attachment.ocrText) {
text += '\n' + attachment.ocrText;
}
}
}
return text;
}
export async function processDocument(
buffer: Buffer,
mimeType: string,

View file

@ -1994,118 +1994,6 @@ console.log('\n=== Game Session Tests ===');
});
});
console.log('\nHost Proof Validation Tests:');
let authGamePin: string | null = null;
await test('POST /api/games with Authorization token stores host_user_id', async () => {
const gameData = {
pin: '777777',
hostPeerId: 'kaboot-777777',
quiz: { title: 'Auth Test Quiz', questions: [] },
gameConfig: {},
};
const { data } = await gameRequest('POST', '/api/games', gameData, {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
}, 201);
if (!(data as { success: boolean }).success) throw new Error('Expected success: true');
authGamePin = '777777';
});
await test('GET /api/games/:pin/host with valid Authorization token succeeds', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
const { data } = await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/${authGamePin}/host`, undefined, {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
});
const game = data as Record<string, unknown>;
if (game.pin !== authGamePin) throw new Error('Wrong PIN');
if (!game.quiz) throw new Error('Missing quiz');
});
await test('PATCH /api/games/:pin with valid Authorization token succeeds', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('PATCH', `/api/games/${authGamePin}`, {
gameState: 'QUESTION',
}, {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
});
const { data } = await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/${authGamePin}/host`, undefined, {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
});
const game = data as Record<string, unknown>;
if (game.gameState !== 'QUESTION') throw new Error('gameState not updated');
});
await test('GET /api/games/:pin/host with neither secret nor token returns 401', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/${authGamePin}/host`, undefined, {}, 401);
});
await test('PATCH /api/games/:pin with neither secret nor token returns 401', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('PATCH', `/api/games/${authGamePin}`, { gameState: 'LOBBY' }, {}, 401);
});
await test('DELETE /api/games/:pin with neither secret nor token returns 401', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('DELETE', `/api/games/${authGamePin}`, undefined, {}, 401);
});
await test('GET /api/games/:pin/host with invalid token returns 401', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/${authGamePin}/host`, undefined, {
'Authorization': 'Bearer invalid-token-12345',
}, 401);
});
await test('PATCH /api/games/:pin with invalid token returns 401', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('PATCH', `/api/games/${authGamePin}`, { gameState: 'LOBBY' }, {
'Authorization': 'Bearer invalid-token-12345',
}, 401);
});
await test('DELETE /api/games/:pin with valid Authorization token succeeds', async () => {
if (!authGamePin) throw new Error('No auth game created');
await gameRequest('DELETE', `/api/games/${authGamePin}`, undefined, {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
});
await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/${authGamePin}`, undefined, {}, 404);
});
await test('POST /api/games without auth allows access via secret only', async () => {
const gameData = {
pin: '888888',
hostPeerId: 'kaboot-888888',
quiz: { title: 'No Auth Quiz', questions: [] },
gameConfig: {},
};
const { data } = await gameRequest('POST', '/api/games', gameData, {}, 201);
const secret = (data as { hostSecret: string }).hostSecret;
await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/888888/host`, undefined, {
'X-Host-Secret': secret,
});
await gameRequest('GET', `/api/games/888888/host`, undefined, {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
}, 404);
await gameRequest('DELETE', '/api/games/888888', undefined, {
'X-Host-Secret': secret,
});
});
console.log('\n=== AI Generate Endpoint Tests ===');
console.log('\nGenerate Status Tests:');